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NUTRITION LABELING: FDA REGULATION OF
CLAIMS OF THERAPEUTIC VALUE IN FOOD
PRODUCT LABELING
In 1973 the Commissioner of the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) promulgated food labeling regulations, to provide more in-
formative nutrition labeling of food products in response to evidence
that most Americans were not receiving adequate nutrition in their
daily diets.! Under the regulations, nutrition labeling is voluntary
1. 21 C.F.R. § 1.17 (1973). These regulations were proposed in 37 Fed. Reg.
6493 (1972). See also 38 Fed. Reg. 2125-32, 6950-61 (1973).
2. See 37 Fed. Reg. 6493-94 (1972); WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE ONT FOOD,
NUTRITION AND HEALTH, FINAL REPORT 295-98 (1970) (recommending adoption
of a uniform system of nutrition labeling to give consumers information on
balancing their daily diets). Information presented at the conference documented
the existence of malnutrition in at least 30 million of the U.S. population. 24
FoOD TECHNOLOGY 866 (1970). In a special message to Congress on consumer
problems President Kennedy stated:
Consumer choice is influenced by mass advertising utilizing highly developed
arts of persuasion. The consumer typically cannot know . . . whether one
prepared food has more nutritional value than another; whether the per-
formance of a product will in fact meet his needs .... [T]he responsibility of
the Government in protecting the consumer is increasingly recognized.
108 CoN. RE. 4167, 4168 (1962).
The President stated four basic rights of the consumer: (1) the right to safety,
(2) the right to be informed-to be protected against fraudulent, deceitful or
grossly misleading information, advertising, labeling or other practices, and to be
given the facts needed to make an informed choice, (3) the right to choose, and
(4) the right to be heard. He asked Congress and every appropriate agency to
enact legislation to protect the consumer interest and to promote the fuller reali-
zation of these consumer rights. Id. at 4168. Recognition of this need re-
sulted in increased pressure within Congress to develop more informative nutri-
tion labeling requirements. See, e.g., H.R. 3702, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973)
(bill to enact Nutritional Labeling Act of 1973); S. 322, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1973) (bill to amend the Fair Packaging and Labeling Act to provide for the
establishment of national standards for nutrition labeling of food commodities).
The Commissioner of the FDA responded by promulgating the nutrition labeling
regulations to "provide consumers with information at the points of purchase
and use to compare products, to evaluate nutritional claims which have been made
for a product, and to prepare a nutritious diet." 38 Fed. Reg. 6952 (1973). The
regulations provide that if nutrition information labeling is required, a listing of
seven important vitamins and minerals must ordinarily be included on the label (vi-
tamins A and C, thiamin, riboflavin, niacin, calcium and iron), and that whenever
a food is labeled with nutrition information, the label must follow a standard
established format (including statements of serving size, servings per container,
caloric content, protein content, carbohydrate content, fat content, and percentage
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for most foods, but full nutrition information labeling is required
if a nutrient is added to a product, even to replace those lost in proc-
essing, or if a statement claiming nutritive value is made for the
food in labeling or advertising3 The regulations prohibit certain
claims, deemed inherently misleading, from appearing on the labels
of food products and supplements.4 This Comment examines the
background, legality and implications of a regulation, section
1.17(h)(9)(i), which provides that:
A food labeled under the provisions of this section shall be deemed
to be misbranded.., if its labeling represents, suggests, or implies:
(1) That the food because of the presence or absence of certain
dietary properties, is adequate or effective in the prevention,
cure, mitigation, or treatment of any disease or symptom.5
Legislative control of false or misleading therapeutic statements in
advertising and labeling was inadequate prior to 1938.0 In that year,
of U.S. Recommended Daily Allowances). Id. at 6959-60. The regulations also
change the standard for levels of vitamins and minerals from "outmoded" FDA
Minimum Daily Requirements to a percentage of U.S. Recommended Daily Allow-
ances (U.S. RDA), allows consumers to identify foods for inclusion in physician-
recommended fat modified diets (labeling for cholesterol and fats), and classifies
products containing vitamins and minerals into three basic categories according to
the percentage of U.S. RDA-food products (less than 50% of U.S. RDA), dietary
supplements (from 50% to 150%), and drugs (greater than 150%).
3. See id. at 2125. Such claims would be confusing and misleading for lack
of completeness and could deceive consumers about the food's true nutritional
contribution in the daily diet. Id.
4. 21 C.F.R. § 1.17 (1973) (food products); 38 Fed. Reg. 20718 (1973)
(foods for special dietary use under 21 C.F.R. § 125.2). These regulations prohibit
any claim or promotional suggestion that: (1) food products or supplements are
sufficient in themselves to prevent, treat or cure disease or symptoms; (2) a
balanced diet of ordinary foods cannot supply adequate nutrients; (3) inadequate
or insufficient daily diet is due to the soil in which food is grown; (4) transpor-
tation, storage, processing or cooking of foods may result in an inadequate or defi-
cient daily diet; (5) the food has dietary properties when such properties have no
significant value or need in human nutrition (i.e., contains rutin, other bioflavo.
noids, inositol and similar ingredients); (6) a natural vitamin in food is superior
to an added or synthetic vitamin.
5. 21 C.F.R. § 1.17(h) (9) (i) (1973). This Comment examines only the
question of the Commissioner's power under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
and does not address any constitutional questions that might be raised with re-
spect to the regulation.
6. Following the turn of the century there was a great increase in the use of
fraudulent therapeutic claims in the sale of proprietary medicines. The Pure Food
and Drug Act of 1906, ch. 3915, 34 Stat. 768, failed to provide adequate con-
trol over these claims. In 1911 the Supreme Court ruled in United States v.
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however, the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act7 declared that
food products with labels bearing claims "misleading in any particu-
lar" constituted misbranded products in violation of the Act9 with-
out regard to fraudulent intent.-0 Under this statute, the Food and
Drug Administration successfully brought numerous actions to prevent
these promotional practices." Nevertheless, because of the inherent
weaknesses of the adjudicative process2-lack of dearly articulated
standards and increased expense and delay in controlling the pro-
scribed conduct-manufacturers and distributors continued to use such
claims. 3 The Commissioner promulgated section 1.17(h)(9)(i) to
Johnson, 221 U.S. 488 (1911), that the term "misbranded" did not apply to
label statements of curative value but only to statements of identity, strength,
quality and purity. One year later Congress passed the Sherley Amendment,
ch. 352, 37 Stat. 416 (1912), which expanded the meaning of "misbranding"
to include false and fraudulent statements concerning therapeutic effects. The
Government, however, was faced with the difficult task of proving fraudulent
intent. The Depression aggravated the evils of false therapeutic promises. After
the Wheeler-Lea Act, ch. 49, 52 Stat. 111 (1938), was passed, giving the FTC
regulatory power over advertising of food and drugs, the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act of 1938, ch. 675, 52 Stat. 1040, was signed into law. See generally
Ohi, New Food and Drug Legislation, 4 Jonw MARSHALL L.Q. 1 (1938);
Young, The Government and the Consumer: Evolution of Food and Drug Laws-
The 1938 Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 13 J. PUB. L. 197 (1964); Develop-
ments in the Law: The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 67 EtIv. L. Rv.
632 (1954).
7. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301, 321 et seq. (1970).
8. Id. § 343(a). See also id. §§ 352(a), 362(a) (drugs and cosmetics).
9. Id. § 331 (a) (prohibits "[t]he introduction or delivery for introduction into
interstate commerce of any food, drug, device, or cosmetic that is ... misbranded").
10. Compare People v. Beggs, 69 Cal. App. 2d 819, 160 P.2d 600 (Dist. Ct. App.
1945) (knowledge or intent to defraud not required under 1938 Act) with Seven
Cases v. United States, 239 U.S. 510 (1915) (1906 Act required intent to deceive).
11. E.g., Kordel v. United States, 335 U.S. 345 (1948); United States v.
Vitasafe Corp., 345 F.2d 864 (3d Cir. 1965); United States v. "Cal's Tupelo
Blossom U.S. Fancy Pure Honey," 344 F.2d 288 (6th Cir. 1965); V.E. Irons,
Inc. v. United States, 244 F.2d 34 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 923 (1957);
United States v. Hohensee, 243 F.2d 367 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 976
(1957). The Federal Trade Commission's orders prohibiting similar misleading
promotional practices have also been upheld. See, e.g., S.S.S. Co. v. FTC, 416
F.2d 226 (6th Cir. 1969); J.B. Williams Co. v. FTC, 381 F.2d 884 (6th Cir.
1967).
12. See note 17 infra.
13. See 38 Fed. Reg. 6958 (1973), citing cases listed in note 21 infra.
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strengthen governmental control over misleading labeling of food
products and supplements. 14 In shifting from an adjudicative to a rule-
making approach, the Commissioner recognized" that the choice be-
tween proceeding by quasi-legislative rule-making or by ad hoc litiga-
tion lies primarily in the informed discretion of the administrative
agency, 6 and that "the particularization of a statute by rule-making
is not only acceptable in lieu of protracted piecemeal litigation ...
but it is the preferred procedure . . .,-1
I. THE AUTHORITY OF THE FDA To PROHIBIT CLAIMS OF
THERAPEUTIC VALUE IN FOOD PRODUCT LABELING
In January 1973, following the issuance of a tentative order promul-
gating the nutrition labeling regulations, the Commissioner allowed
interested persons to file written exceptions with the Commissioner,
challenging his authority under the 1938 Act to adopt regulations
prohibiting statements of therapeutic value from appearing on the
labels of food products and supplements. s To justify these prohibi-
14. 38 Fed. Reg. 6958 (1973). The Commissioner concluded:
[R]ellance upon scare promotional claims, designed to panic the public into
believing that nutrient fortification or supplementation is necessary to prevent
the onset of severe deficiency diseases, is neither supported by the available
scientific and medical facts nor fosters good nutritional practices.
Id.
15. See id. at 6951.
16. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947).
17. Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Richardson, 446 F.2d 466, 468 (2d Cir. 1971). See
generally Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Develop-
ment of Administrative Policy, 78 HARv. L. Rv. 921 (1965). In National Petro-
leum Refiners Ass'n V. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 681 (D.C. Cir. 1973), the court stated:
[T]here is little question that the availability of substantive rule-making gives
any agency an invaluable resource-saving flexibility in carrying out its task
of regulating parties subject to its statutory mandate. More than merely
expediting the agency's job, use of substantive rule-making is increasingly felt
to yield significant benefits to those the agency regulates. Increasingly, courts
are recognizing that use of rule-making to make innovations in agency policy
may actually be fairer to regulated parties than total reliance on case-by-
case adjudication.
A justification for the rule-making procedure is expressed in K. DAvIs, ADMINIS-
TRATIVE LAw TFxT 151 (3d ed. 1972):
One fundamental probability is that nearly all businessmen comply nearly all
the time with law that is clear, but when their lawyers don't know what the
law requires they often go ahead with whatever practices maximize profits.
The way to create administrative activity that will be expensive ... is to keep
the law unclear. And the way to keep the law unclear is to do nothing to clar-
ify it except to bring prosecutions and to work out some conflicting case law.
18. See 38 Fed. Reg. 2143 (1973). See also id. at 6396, 6951, 20710.
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tions, the Commissioner relied on section 371 (a) of the Act (which
gives the Commissioner the authority to promulgate regulations for
the efficient enforcement of the Act),'19 various other sections of the
Act dealing specifically with the problem of misbranded foods,20 and
several judicial decisions upholding the promulgation of rules on the
basis of similar statutory authority.2 ' It appears the Commissioner was
correct in his assertion that the promulgation of these specific provi-
sions of the 1973 regulation did not exceed his authority under the
1938 Act.
The validity of a regulation promulgated under section 371 (a),
the empowering provision of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, will
be sustained as long as it is reasonably related to the purposes of the
enabling legislation 2- The application of this "reasonable relation-
ship" standard is illustrated by the Supreme Court's decision in United
19. 21 U.S.C. § 371(a) (1970). The statute itself gives this power to the
Secretary of HEW. This power, however, was redelegated to the Commissioner.
21 C.F.R. § 2.120 (1973).
20. 21 U.S.C. § 321(n) (1970) (reproduced in note 31 infra); id. § 343(a)
(false and misleading labeling); id. § 343(j) (representation for special dietary
use). See generally 38 Fed. Reg. 2124, 20710 (1973).
21. 38 Fed. Reg. 6951 (1973). Specifically, the Commissioner relied on Abbott
Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967) (regulations issued by the Com-
missioner have the force of law and the district court has jurisdiction to undertake
pre-enforcement review of the regulation); FPC v. Texaco, Inc., 377 U.S. 33
(1964) (upheld regulation establishing "permissible" pricing provisions in con-
tracts of natural gas producers and stating that any contract containing other
provisions shall be rejected); United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351
U.S. 192 (1956) (FCC's maximum station ownership regulation upheld and
found to have force of law with respect to ripeness for review); SEC v. Chenery
Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947); Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Richardson, 446 F.2d 466
(2d Cir. 1971) (Commissioner of FDA has power to issue binding interpretive
regulations requiring that a new drug applicant present "substantial evidence" of
effectiveness before being given an opportunity for a hearing). In FPC v. Texaco,
Inc., 377 U.S. 33 (1964), the Court held that the statutory requirement of a
hearing did not preclude the Commissioner from particularizing statutory stand-
ards through the rulemaking power.
22. See Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356 (1973). In
Mourning the "Four Installment Rule" was promulgated under an empowering pro-
vision providing that the agency may make "such rules and regulations as may be
necessary to carry out the provisions of the Act." The Court held that the Rule
was not promulgated in excess of the Federal Reserve Board's authority, was
reasonably related to its objectives, and was not inconsistent with the Truth in
Lending Act. Id. See also National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S.
190 (1943).
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States v. Storer Broadcasting Co.,23 upholding a regulation of the Fed-
eral Communications Commission (FCC) against a claim that prom-
ulgation of the regulation exceeded the Commission's authority
under the Federal Communications Act of 1934.24 The Court reasoned
that the FCC, dealing with the public interest and operating under a
statute designed to protect the public, had broad powers to promul-
gate a maximum station ownership regulation. The regulation was
held reconcilable with the purpose of the Federal Communications
Act as a whole.25 This reasoning would also seem to justify the FDA's
prohibition of claims of therapeutic value in labeling.
The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act is designed to protect
the health.2 and economic interests27 of consumers, who, under present
conditions, are largely unable to protect themselves in this field.28 The
Act is aimed not only at false and fraudulent claims, but also at clever
indirection, ambiguity29 and exaggerated or overemphasized state-
23. 351 U.S. 192 (1956).
24. 47 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1970).
25. The Court in Storer Broadcasting Co. stated: (1) the Commission deals
with the public interest; (2) Congress sought to create regulation for public pro-
tection; (3) the growing complexity of the economy induced Congress to put the
regulation of business in specialized agencies with broad powers; (4) the courts
are slow to interfere with the agency's conclusions when reconcilable with statu-
tory directive; and (5) the rules were reconcilable with the act as a whole. 351
U.S. at 203-04. The justification of a regulation depends on the statutory scheme
as a whole. See Toilet Goods Ass'n v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158, 163 (1967).
26. United States v. "Cal's Tupelo Blossom U.S. Fancy Pure Honey," 344
F.2d 288, 289 (6th Cir. 1965); United States v. Omar, Inc., 91 F. Supp. 121,
123 (D. Neb. 1950).
27. United States v. Article ... Consisting of 216 Cartoned Bottles, 409 F.2d
734 (2d Cir. 1969); United States v. Three Cartons, 132 F. Supp. 569 (S.D.
Cal. 1952); United States v. 30 Cases, 93 F. Supp. 764 (S.D. Iowa 1950) (the
purpose is not the protection of merchants and traders but rather of the con-
sumer public).
28. United States v. Vitasafe Corp., 345 F.2d 864, 870 (3d Cir. 1965). The
Supreme Court has stated:
The purposes of this legislation . . . "touch phases of the lives and health of
people which, in the circumstances of modern industrialism, are largely be-
yond self-protection. Regard for these purposes should infuse construction of
the legislation if it is to be treated as a working instrument of govern-
ment . . 2'
62 Cases of Jam v. United States, 340 U.S. 593, 596 (1951), quoting United
States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 280 (1943).
29. V.E. Irons, Inc. v. United States, 244 F.2d 34 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 354
U.S. 923 (1957); United States v. One Device, 160 F.2d 194 (10th Cir. 1947).
See also United States v. 95 Barrels of Vinegar, 265 U.S. 438 (1924) (under
1906 Act).
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ments or representations.30 The terms of the statute condemn every
statement, design or device that may mislead or deceive, and it has
been held that deception may result from the use of statements tech-
nically correct but misleading in total impression.3 1
Under the Act, false or misleading labeling is "measured by its
significance as read by those to whom it appeals."3 2 The determining
factor is the attraction of the statements to the average person 33-to
people of ordinary understanding and discrimination.34 The courts
have rejected the contention that the test should be the significance
30. United States v. Vitasafe Corp., 345 F.2d 864 (3d Cir. 1965); V.E. Irons,
Inc. v. United States, 244 F.2d 34 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 923 (1957).
31. United States v. 95 Barrels of Vinegar, 265 U.S. 438 (1924) (under 1906
Act); Taylor v. United States, 80 F.2d 604 (5th Cir. 1935). 95 Barrels was
followed in numerous cases after the enactment of the 1938 Act. See, e.g., V.E.
Irons, Inc. v. United States, 244 F.2d 34 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 923
(1957); United States v. One Device, 160 F.2d 194 (10th Cir. 1947). The
holding also was reflected in FTC decisions. See, e.g., Sebrone Co. v. FTC, 135
F.2d 676 (7th Cir. 1943); Bockenstette v. FTC, 134 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1943).
This doctrine is specifically incorporated in 21 U.S.C. § 321(n) (1970), which
provides:
[I]n determining whether the labeling is misleading there shall be taken into
account . . .not only representations made or suggested by statement, word,
design, device, or any combination thereof, but also the extent to which the
labeling fails to reveal facts material with respect to consequences which may
result from the use of the article to which the labeling relates ....
32. United States v. Vitamin Indus., Inc., 130 F. Supp. 755, 767 (D. Neb.
1955). See also Hall v. United States, 267 F.2d 795 (5th Cir. 1920) (in de-
termining whether a drug product or an article is misbranded, the language
used on the label or package is to be given the meaning ordinarily conveyed by
it to those to whom it is addressed).
33. Royal Baking Powder Co. v. Emerson, 270 F.2d 429 (8th Cir. 1920), appeal
dismissed, 260 U.S. 752 (1922); United States v. Vitamin Indus., Inc., 130 F.
Supp. 755 (D. Neb. 1955).
34. United States v. Vitamin Indus., Inc., 130 F. Supp. 755 (D. Neb. 1955);
see Royal Baking Powder Co. v. Emerson, 270 F.2d 429 (8th Cir. 1920), appeal
dismissed, 260 U.S. 752 (1922) (the average buyer is the person of average
intelligence, exercising ordinary care in ascertaining what he is purchasing).
What is pertinent is the effect the claims would have on . . . prospective
purchasers and actual customers ... who cannot be presumed to have special
expertness or to be unduly cautious, but who are . . . pathetically eager to
find some simple cure-all for the diseases with which they are afflicted or who
are susceptible to luridly painted scare literature as to the prospect of being
disease-ridden unless they consistently partake of the vaunted drug product.
V.E. Irons, Inc. v. United States, 244 F.2d 34, 39-40 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
354 U.S. 923 (1957). Accord, United States v. 47 Bottles, More or Less, 320
F.2d 564, 571 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 953 (1963).
1974]
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of the statements to observers of notably superior intelligence,", ex-
perts in nutrition,G overly skeptical buyers,37 or, at the other extreme,
to the mentally dull or infirm.38 The ultimate impression on the con-
sumer is based not only on what is said but also on all that is
reasonably implied.3 9 Thus the Commissioner concluded:
When consumers read a label .. . wherein a literally true state-
ment is made, e.g., "Night blindness is caused by a lack of vitamin
A," they frequently conclude that the symptom will appear in
them unless they use the product being promoted, or ... even
though they may not suffer from the specific symptoms described,
the product will be generally good for improving their vision.
40
The danger of these misleading claims to the health of the consuming
public is that the claims tend to encourage people to experiment and
delay seeking proper medical attention and treatment.4 '
35. United States v. 47 Bottles, More or Less, 320 F.2d 564 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 953 (1963); V.E. Irons, Inc. v. United States, 244 F.2d 34
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 923 (1957).
36. See cases cited note 35 supra.
37. Id.
38. United States v. Vitamin Indus., Inc., 130 F. Supp. 755 (D. Neb. 1955).
"The purpose of the [Act] is to protect the public . . . which includes the ig-
norant, the unthinking, and the credulous who, when making a purchase, do not
stop to analyze." United States v. 62 Packages, 48 F. Supp. 878, 887 (W.D. Wis.
1943). See also United States v. Article . . . Consisting of 216 Cartoned Bot-
tles, 409 F.2d 734 (2d Cir. 1969); Gulf Oil Corp. v. FTC, 150 F.2d 106 (5th
Cir. 1945).
39. See, e.g., United States v. 46 Cartons, 113 F. Supp. 336 (D.N.J. 1953)
(it is not likely that the buying public ordinarily would carefully study or weigh
each word); cf. Aronberg v. FTC, 132 F.2d 165 (7th Cir. 1942).
40. 38 Fed. Reg. 2147 (1973). The Commissioner also concluded that thera-
peutic value may not be disclaimed in product labeling, since such statements
are also misleading and fail to correct an otherwise false or misleading statement
or implication. Id. at 20716, citing United States v. 47 Bottles, More or Less, 320
F.2d 564 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 953 (1963); United States v. Millpax,
Inc., 313 F.2d 152 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 903 (1963); United States v.
Nutrition Serv., Inc., 227 F. Supp. 375 (W.D. Pa. 1964), aff'd, 347 F.2d 233 (3d
Cir. 1965); United States v. Three Cartons, 132 F. Supp. 569 (S.D. Cal. 1952).
41. United States v. Kordel, 164 F.2d 913 (7th Cir. 1947), afl'd, 335 U.S.
345 (1948); United States v. Nutrition Serv., Inc., 227 F. Supp. 375 (W.D. Pa.
1964), afl'd, 347 F.2d 233 (3d Cir. 1965); see, e.g., Drown v. United States,
198 F.2d 999 (9th Cir. 1952) (chiropractor's therapeutic instruments of own
design claiming "fantastic" curative qualities on label were dangerous to human
health even though harmless, when users, misled by claims, relied upon device
instead of medical advice). See also United States v. 2000 Plastic Tubular
Cases, 231 F. Supp. 236 (M.D. Pa. 1964) (reliance on labeling claims that
[Vol. 8:357
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It is apparent from the legislative history of the 1938 Act that Con-
gress intended to strengthen governmental protection of the consumer
against these false and misleading claims.42 Moreover, the Food and
Drug Administration deals with the public interest and has broad rule-
making power to carry out the purposes of the Act.4 3 In view of the
purposes of the Act and the theory of liberal construction laid down
by the courts in this area,44 the standards set forth in Storer Broad-
casting Co.45 to uphold an FCC regulation can be applied to authorize
the FDA's promulgation of section 1.17(h)(9)(i).
toothbrush prevents gum disease, pyorrhea and trench mouth, constitutes a
hazard to health because such reliance could prevent or delay effective treat-
ment and lead to serious injury). The court in 2000 Plastic Tubular Cases
did not consider the claims that the toothbrush was effective for prevention
of cancer, heart disease, defective birth of offspring, and loss of teeth, because
"[flor the Government to prevail, it is not necessary that all the representa-
tions . . . are false; if any single claim in the labeling is . . . misleading, the
!article] is misbranded." Id. at 240. Accord, United States v. Vitasafe Formula
M, 226 F. Supp. 266, 278 (D.N.J. 1964).
42. See H.R. RP. No. 2139, 75th Cong., 3d Seas. 1 (1938):
This act seeks to set up effective provisions against abuses of consumer welfare
growing out of inadequacies in the [Act] of June 30, 1906 ....
While the old law has been of incalculable benefit to American consumers,
it contains serious loopholes and is not sufficiently broad in its scope to
meet the requirements of consumer protection under modem conditions.
Id.
43. See Austern, Sanctions in Silhouette: An Inquiry Into the Enforcement of
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 51 CALIF. L. REv. 38, 39 (1963).
The courts have given broad scope to the discretion and informed judgment of
the administrative agency. "That judgment, if based on substantial evidence of
record, and if within statutory and constitutional limitations, is controlling even
though the reviewing court might on the same record have arrived at a different
conclusion." Federal Security Adm'r v. Quaker Oats Co., 318 U.S. 228 (1943).
"The wisdom of the principle adopted is none of [the Court's] concern ....
Our duty is at an end when ... the ... action is based upon substantial evidence
and is consistent with the authority granted by Congress." SEC v. Chenery Corp.,
332 U.S. 194, 207 (1947).
44. Public interest demands that the Act, being remedial in nature, should be
construed liberally to meet its intended beneficial purposes. See, e.g., United
States v. An Article of Drug, 394 U.S. 784 (1969); United States v. Dotterweich,
320 U.S. 277 (1943); United States v. "Cal's Tupelo Blossom U.S. Fancy Pure
Honey," 344 F.2d 288 (6th Cir. 1965); United States v. Lee, 131 F.2d 464 (7th
Cir. 1942). This remains true despite the penal nature of the Act. See also
United States v. Kordel, 164 F.2d 913 (7th Cir. 1947), aft'd, 335 U.S. 345
(1948); United States v. Omar, Inc., 91 F. Supp. 121 (D. Neb. 1950) (public
and social purposes served by such legislation greatly exceed the inconvenience
and hardship imposed on the individual).
45. 351 U.S. 192 (1956). See also note 25 supra.
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II. Tm_ MISBRANDING PROVISION: SANCTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
Nutrition labeling regulations have the force and effect of law.40
The Supreme Court in Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner4 stated that
if the regulations are "within the Commissioner's authority, they
have the status of law and violations of them carry heavy criminal
and civil sanctions." 48 Violation of this prohibition against making
claims of therapeutic value is a violation of the misbranding provision
of the Act .49 and subject to its triple sanction of seizure,6O injunctioncl
and criminal prosecution.52 While criminal prosecutions for charges of
economic deception have been relatively infrequent, the threat of
criminal prosecution by the agency's "lifted eyebrow" techniqueS3
has been effective in deterring violations of the Act.r'
The purpose of the seizure provision is to "arrest the distribution
of an article... whose labeling is fraudulent or misleading, pending
46. See Toilet Goods Ass'n v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158 (1967); Abbott Labora-
tories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967) (rule promulgated under § 701(a) of the
Act has force of law and may be judicially reviewed at outset). But see Cody,
Authoritative Effect of FDA Regulations, 24 Foon DRUG Cosm. L.J. 195 (1969)
(arguing that § 701 (a) authorized only interpretive, not legislative, rules) ; Thomp-
son, FDA-They Mean Well, But .... , 28 FooD DRUG Cosm. L.J. 205 (1973).
47. 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
48. Id. at 151-52.
49. See note 9 supra.
50. 21 U.S.C. § 334(a) (1970) (permits multiple seizure of misbranded
articles); see, e.g., United States v. Vitasafe Corp., 345 F.2d 864 (3d Cir. 1965);
United States v. Detroit Vital Foods, Inc., 330 F.2d 78 (6th Cir. 1964); United
States v. Four Devices, 176 F.2d 652 (10th Cir. 1949).
51. 21 U.S.C. § 332(a) (1970); see, e.g., Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry,
Inc., 339 U.S. 594, rehearing denied, 340 U.S. 857 (1950); United States v.
Vitasafe Corp., 345 F.2d 864 (3d Cir. 1965); United States v. Ellis Research
Laboratories, Inc., 300 F.2d 550 (7th Cir. 1962); United States v. Nutrition
Serv., Inc., 227 F. Supp. 375 (W.D. Pa. 1964), aff'd, 347 F.2d 233 (3d Cir. 1965).
52. 21 U.S.C. § 333 (1970). Section 333(a) provides that violation carries a
possible sanction of imprisonment for not more than one year, or $1,000 fine, or
both, and section 333 (b) imposes more severe penalties in cases of violation of any
provision of section 331 with intent to defraud or mislead. See, e.g., United States
v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943); United States v. Millpax, Inc., 313 F.2d
152 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 903 (1963); United States v. Kordel, 164
F.2d 913 (7th Cir. 1947), aff'd, 325 U.S. 345 (1948).
53. "Regulation by lifted eyebrow" is an informal method of enforcement by
the suggestion or implied threat of action or publicity. This procedure is not unique
to the FDA. See 1 DAvis, ADmINIsTRATiv LAv TREATISE § 4.03, at 241-42
(3d ed. 1958); Austern, supra note 43, at 41.
54. See Developments in the Law, supra note 6, at 693-94.
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a determination of the issue of . . .misbranding."55 Under section
1.17(h)(9)(i), however, there is no need to make a subsequent mis-
branding determination.6 The regulation declares that claims of
therapeutic value are inherently misleading; hence, products contain-
ing such labeling claims are misbranded and in violation of the Act.
Therefore, the purpose of the seizure provision is limited to removing
misbranded products from distribution. As a result, there may be an
increase in the use of the criminal sanction as a supplement to seizure
and injunction. This criminal prosecution sanction, requiring no
element of criminal intent to defraud, has been severely criticized.5
7
The prohibition of statements of therapeutic value eliminates the
need for the Government to classify foods as drugs before making the
determination of misbranding. The tendency in the past has been for
the courts to make a two-step determination in imposing liability:r s
first, that the claims bring the article within the definition of a drug59
55. Ewing v. Mlytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594, 601, rehearing
denied, 340 U.S. 857 (1950) (emphasis added).
56. See note 61 infra.
57. See generally Austern, supra note 43. Austern forcefully argues against strict
criminal liability:
Criminal prosecution can follow with equal ease for violations of minor
economic regulations as for major threatened injury to the public health.
The same penal consequences can flow from using the wrong words . . .as
would follow from the addition of a poison to that food....
This indiscriminate application of the same drastic criminal sanction,
irrespective of the character or magnitude of the violation involved, and
under the absolute rule of strict criminal liability, is a historical accident
in this field.
Id. at 46. But see United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 281 (1943)
(effective protection of the public demands imposing the risk of liability on those
responsible for violations irrespective of their knowledge). See also Developments
in the Law, supra note 6, at 693-701.
58. See generally Erlebacker, When Is a "Cosmetic" Also a "Drug" Under the
Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 27 FooD DRUG Cosm. L.J. 740 (1972).
59. See United States v. Article ...Consisting of 216 Cartoned Bottles, 409
F.2d 734 (2d Cir. 1969) (facial lotion classified as drug); United States v. "Cal's
Tulepo Blossom U.S. Fancy Pure Honey," 344 F.2d 288 (6th Cir. 1965) (honey
classified as drug); Bradley v. United States, 264 F.2d 79 (5th Cir. 1920) (mineral
water classified as drug); United States v. Articles of Drug, 263 F. Supp. 212
(D. Neb. 1967) (vitamin laxative classified as drug); United States v. Nutrition
Serv., Inc., 227 F. Supp. 375 (W.D. Pa. 1964), aff'd, 347 F.2d 233 (3d Cir
1965) (dietary aid classified as drug); United States v. 46 Cartons, 113 F.
Supp. 336 (D.N.J. 1953) (cigarette with labeling claiming to mitigate respiratory
and other ailments classified as drug). Section 321(g) (1) (b) of the Act defines
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and secondly, that since these claims appear on the label, they con-
stitute misbranding because they are false and misleading. 0 Under
the new regulation, the Government need not prove that the food is
a drug, for the prohibition applies directly to food products and sup-
plements. The Government is required to prove only that a claim of
therapeutic value appeared in the labeling.01
While consumer protection is furthered by the prohibition of
therapeutic claims and implications in labeling, the public is still
subject to these same statements in advertising because the FDA does
not have the authority to regulate advertising of food products.02
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC), however, is granted special
authority over all advertising of foods, drugs, devices and cosmetics. 0 3
a "drug" as "articles intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment,
or prevention of disease . . . ." 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1)(b) (1970) (emphasis
added). It is the intended use of the article that determines whether it is a drug,
regardless of its inherent properties or dictionary definition. United States v.
Articles of Drug, 263 F. Supp. 212, 215 (D. Neb. 1967). The intended use is
determined by claims on the labels, accompanying labeling, promotional material,
advertising or any other relevant sources. United States v. Article... Consisting
of 216 Cartoned Bottles, 409 F.2d 734, 742 (2d Cir. 1969); United States v.
Articles of Drug, 263 F. Supp. 212, 215 (D. Neb. 1967). Thus, if a food or food
supplement makes any claims of therapeutic value, it may also be classified as a
drug for the purposes of the law. The two terms are not mutually exclusive. See
38 Fed. Reg. 20710 (1973). See also S. REP. No. 361, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4
(1935):
The use to which the product is to be put will determine the category into
which it will fall. If it is to be used only as a food it will come within the
definition of food and none other. If it contains nutritive ingredients but is
sold for drug use only, as clearly shown by the labeling and advertising, it
will come within the definition of drug, but not that of food. If it is sold to
be used both as a food and for the prevention or treatment of disease it
would satisfy both definitions and be subject to the substantive requirements
for both.
Id.
Therefore attempts by producers of food products or supplements to avoid the
effect of the regulation by claiming that the product is a drug, not a food, may
be ineffective.
60. See cases cited note 59 supra.
61. Nevertheless, the courts will have to determine whether the statement was,
in fact, a claim or implication of therapeutic value.
62. This is specifically acknowledged by the Commissioner. See 38 Fed. Reg.
6951 (1973). Following intensive legislative battles to decide whether the FDA
should have jurisdiction over false and misleading advertising, all sections
pertinent to advertising in proposed bills were incorporated into the FTC Wheeler-
Lea Bill, 15 U.S.C. § 44 et seq. (1970). See also S. 5, 75th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1937); 81 CONG. REc. 2018-19 (1937).
63. 15 U.S.C. §§ 52-56 (1970).
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In National Petroleum Refiners Association v. FTC64 the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia recently held that the FTC,
under the Federal Trade Commission Act, is empowered to promul-
gate substantive rules of business conduct-Trade Regulation Rules.
The court stated that the FTC, under its mandate to prevent "unfair
or deceptive acts or practices," has the responsibility and expansive
power to protect the consumer from being misled by governing the
conditions under which goods are advertised, and to proscribe con-
duct it deems harmful to the consumer.6 Indeed, in light of the
FTC's broad power and the courts' favorable attitude toward sub-
stantive rule-making, it would seem appropriate for the FTC to
promulgate a regulation similar to section 1.17 that prohibits mislead-
ing statements of therapeutic value from appearing in advertising,
thereby fully protecting the consumer from these claims.
A major objection to the regulation-6 is that the prohibitions re-
64. 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (upheld, as within the rule-makling power
of the FTC, a trade regulation rule declaring that failure to post octane numbers
on gasoline pumps at service stations would be an "unfair method of competition"
and a "deceptive practice" in violation of the Federal Trade Commission Act).
In upholding the power of the FTC to promulgate substantive rules, the court
stated:
[Jiudicial precedents concerning rule-making by other agencies and the back-
ground and purpose of the Federal Trade Commission Act lead us liberally
to construe the term "rules and regulations." The substantive rule here un-
questionably implements the statutory plan.
Id. at 678.
65. Id. at 685.
66. The National Health Federation voiced strong objection to the regulation,
alleging that the FDA is trying to crack down on health food stores by forcing food
supplements that do not meet the requirements of the regulation off the market.
The Federation reacted to the regulation by giving strong support to the Hosmer
Bill, H.R. 643, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), which would limit the authority of
the FDA in regulating food supplements. Responding to inquiries concerning the
potential effect of these regulations on -itamin-mineral products in the market-
place, the Assistant General Counsel of Health Education and Welfare (Food and
Drug Division) stated:
The only v.itamin-mineral products now on the market that will be "forced
off" because of the FDA regulations are those that have inherently irrational
formulations or rest solely upon unsupportable claims. The vast majority of
the vitamin-mineral products affected by the new regulations will require only
reformulation and relabeling. We cannot believe that any manufacturer wiiU
be unable to continue in business. Such statements are emotional reactions,
perhaps due to some of the erroneous statements that have been made about
the new regulations, and do not reflect an accurate understanding of the
regulations.
Letter from Peter Hutt to Senators Nelson, McGovern and Cranston, and Con-
gressmen Harrington and Eckhardt, July 9, 1973, on file with the Urban Law
Annual.
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move from the consumer's view statements that may be literally true,
yet which the Commissioner has determined to be inherently mislead-
ing, in spite of today's emphasis on providing the consumer with as
much labeling information as possible. The FDA, however, faces the
difficult task of balancing two consumer interests. The first is the
need to protect consumers who are either incapable themselves of
making a rational choice based on these claims or who may be easily
misled because of the need for some cure-all, especially the elderly
and the infirm. The second interest is that of the consumer who is
objective enough to see through any potentially misleading statement
and who demands to know all the relevant facts. In balancing these
interests, the FDA must consider the basic purpose of the Act-to
protect the average consumer who, because of sophisticated promo-
tional techniques and modem industrialism, is unable to protect
himself. In view of the dominant remedial purposes of the Act and
the broad statutory authority to promulgate rules to implement these
purposes, the Commissioner was authorized and justified in promul-
gating section 1.17(h)(9)(i) of the nutrition labeling regulation. Ther-
apeutic information and advice should come from the consumer's
doctor rather than from mass promotional techniques.
Alan G. Stone
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